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DENATURALIZING THE
LAWYER-STATESMAN
Anthony V. Alfieri*
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF Ti

LEGAL PROFESSION.

By Anthony T. Kronman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1993. Pp. viii, 422. $35.
INTRODUCTION

Anthony Kronman's' new book, The Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession,is an eloquent and impassioned work of
scholarship. It makes an important contribution to the growing
body of literature devoted to the study of the legal profession.2 Indeed, at first sight, it presents claims that carry significant empirical
and normative appeal. Yet, this appeal quickly wanes, leaving
troubling Aristotelian
claims of elite lawyer tradition-bound wis3
dom in judgment.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown
University; J.D. 1984, Columbia University School of Law. - Ed. I am grateful to Naomi
Cahn, Mary Coombs, Michael Fischl, Ellen Grant, Amelia Hope, Lili Levi, Peter Margulies,
Russell Pearce, and Steve Schnably for their comments and support. I also wish to thank
Sally Madigan, Felicity McGrath, Caryn Vogel, Elsa Waite, and the University of Miami
School of Law library staff for their research assistance.
This essay is dedicated to June Nigro and John Alfieri.
1. Dean and Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2. Recent literature on the legal profession signals a revival of interest in both the theory
and the practice of professionalism. See, e.g., Symposium, Critical Theoriesand Legal Ethics,
81 GEo. L.J. 2457 (1993); Symposium, The Emperor's Old Prose: Reexamining the Language
of Law, 77 ComRLL L. REV. 1233 (1992); Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession,44
CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 333 (1994); Lawyering Theory Symposium: Thinking Through the
Legal Culture, 37 N.Y.L. Scn. L REv. 1 (1992); Symposium, The Many Voices of Clinical
Legal Education, 1 CUNICAL L. REV. 1 (1994); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 717 (1992); Symposium, The
21st Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap To Be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 505 (1994); see
also Symposium, Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525 (1993).
3. Kronman disputes "the claim that practical wisdom is simply a species of intuition."
Anthony Kronman, PracticalWisdom and Professional Character,4 Soc. PrnL & PoLY. 203,
209 (1986) [hereinafter Kronman, PracticalWisdom and ProfessionalCharacter]. This claim,
he objects, "ignores the fact that the judgments of the practically wise man are arrived at by a
process which is reflective and intellectually disciplined in a way that the concept of intuition,
as we ordinarily employ it, fails to convey." Id. Put simply, "the judgments at which a practically wise man arrives are thought out." Id.; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the
Law, 54 U. CGi.L. REv. 835,848-49 (1987) (depicting intuition as a "nonreflective" form of
comprehension) [hereinafter Kronman, Living in the Law]; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts,92 YALE L. 763,790 (1983) ("Judgment is skill in deliberation
- it is the skill of deliberating well - whereas intuition brings deliberation to an end and is
something altogether different from it.").
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Kronman accords tradition an authority that holds "inherent
and direct" sway over the practice of law.4 The attitude of traditionalism obliges lawyers to take up the "custodial" work of conserving past ideals in the manner of a "trusteeship."5 At stake is
the ideal of lawyer wisdom manifested in good judgment. The traditionalist understands this ideal

-

and its preservation

-

to be

'6
essential to professional "meaning and dignity.
Kronman's traditionalist thesis is that the caliber of a lawyer's
mind and the virtue of his character determine the quality of his
deliberative judgment. 7 The higher the caliber of mind and the
greater the virtue of character a lawyer possesses, the more outstanding his judgment. On its face, this proposition seems benign.
It becomes pernicious, however, when applied to deify the mind
and character of elite private lawyers. Kronman, in defending this
proposition, appears to suggest that outstanding judgment is virtually the sole province of white, male, large-firm private lawyers.
Furthermore, he intimates that these lawyers constitute a kind of
natural aristocracy marked by a superior inheritance of intellectual
discipline and moral virtue. This essay considers whether
Kronman's defense of elite lawyer deliberative judgment condemns
the worthiness of his project.
Kronman's project ,isredemptive; he seeks to turn back the
"apocalyptic" forces of nihilism, commerce, and irresponsibility
that have beset the legal profession for more than a century (p. 1).
His strategy of deliverance rests upon the recovery of a nineteenthcentury artifact: the ideal of the lawyer-statesman. 8 This ideal consists of four elements: practical wisdom, prudentialism, craft, and
4. Compare Anthony T. Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99 YALE IJ.1029, 1047-48
(1990) (extending Edmund Burke's defense of traditionalism) with David Luban, Legal

Traditionalism,43 STAN. L. REv. 1035, 1057 (1991) (defending a "rationalist inquiry into the
justification of traditions").

5. Kromnan, Precedentand Tradition, supra note 4, at 1066-67 (justifying "respect" for
the past "because the world of culture that we inherit from it makes us who we are").
6. Kronman, Living in the Law, supra note 3, at 873.

7. Kronman describes the "phenomenon of judgment" in terms of process: "the process
of deliberating about and deciding personal, moral, and political problems." Id. at 846.
8. By artifact, I mean "a social construct - a thing - consisting of historically specific
ideals and discourses." Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HAs-

Tm6s LJ. 769, 770 (1992) (footnote omitted); see also RoBERTo MANGABEIRA UNGER,
FAtsE NEcassrr.

ANTi-NEcESSITARMN SOCIAL THEORY fN iiT

SERVICE OF RADnCAL DE-

MocRAcy 2 (1987) (observing that social theories "whether or not radical in their intentions,
see society as an artifact"); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv.L. Rnv. 563, 586 (1983) (discussing the "artifactual character of social life").
Carrie Menkel-Meadow detects a "false 'nostalgia'" in Kronman's nineteenth-century
invocation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field- What's
Missingfrom the MacCrateReport - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69
WASH. L REv. 593, 623 (1994); see also James M. Altman, Modem Litigators and LawyerStatesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031, 1071 (1994) (reviewing KloNmAN, THE LosT LAwYER)
("IThe lawyer-statesman ideal has not been a credible professional ideal for most litigators
for about a century, at least.").
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public service. Kronman interweaves these elements throughout
the seven chapters of The Lost Lawyer.9 The chapters map both
philosophical and sociological paths to the "gloomy conclusion"
that the lawyer-statesman ideal is dead (p. 7). Unlike Kronman, I
do not mourn the death of the lawyer-statesman. In law, artifactual
death is liberating. It spurs new sociolegal configurations and
meanings and, thereby, provides an opportunity to reconstruct both
the form and the substance of our ideals. Thus, we should not
mourn the death of the lawyer-statesman ideal; rather, we should
contest its constitutive claims in order to reconstruct the meaning of
professionalism.
This essay follows the structure of Kronman's main claims. Part
I examines practical wisdom in the context of counseling, advocacy,
and judging. Part II analyzes prudentialism in the setting of legal
education and scholarship. Part Ill assesses craft and public service
in the circumstances of large-firm corporate law practice.
I.

PRACTICAL WISDOM

Kronman begins The Lost Lawyer with prophetic "urgency" (p.
6). There is, he proclaims, a "crisis" afflicting the American legal
profession (p. 1). It is an inward "crisis of morale," pride, and selfconfidence, a "collective identity crisis" so grave that it threatens
the soul of the profession (pp. 2, 165, 354). He finds evidence of
this "spiritual crisis" in the profession's intensifying "doubts about
the capacity of a lawyer's life to offer fulfillment."' 10 Kronman's
threshold assumption is that the practice of law affords, or rather
should afford, lawyers a source of "intrinsic" human fulfillment 1
and society a supply 2 of wise statesmen. 13 He laments the "demise" of the ideal of the lawyer-statesman realized in the character
9. The first three chapters arise out of lectures Kronman delivered in 1987 at the University of Michigan Law School. P. vii.
10. P. 2. The death of the lawyer-statesman ideal suggests to Kronman that "lawyers will
find it harder to believe their work provides intrinsic fulfillment of any kind." P. 3.
11. Kronman's claim of lawyer-driven secular fulfillment rests on historical conjecture.
He speculates that "earlier generations of American lawyers conceived their highest goal to
be the attainment of a wisdom that lies beyond technique - a wisdom about human beings
and their tangled affairs that anyone who wishes to provide real deliberative counsel must
possess." P. 2. These generations, he adds, understood "wisdom to be a trait of character
that one acquires only by becoming a person of good judgment, and not just an expert in the
law." P. 2. On this understanding, "it seemed obvious that a lawyer's life could be deeply
fulfilling." P. 2.
12. Pp. 2-3. Curtailing this supply, Kronman exclaims, spells "disaster for the country."
P. 3.
13. Kronman's threshold assumption rests on contestable factual premises regarding the
need for satisfaction in the public sphere of work and the necessity of elite, professional
leadership in the public sphere of politics. The first premise overlooks the satisfaction many
reap from the private sphere of work through care-giving. The second premise disregards the
merits of a more diverse, populist pool of political leadership.
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of "outstanding" lawyers such as Abraham Lincoln, Earl Warren,
Robert Jackson, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and
David Souter. 14 For these lawyers, law is a noble, "craftlike" activity that infuses professional life with "personal meaning" (pp. 35152). To Kronman, the "outstanding" quality of a lawyer's character
gains expression not only in technical virtuosity, but also in the Aristotelian virtues of practical wisdom and prudence.' 5 The character virtues of wisdom and prudence determine the "quality" of a
lawyer's "judgment."' 6 Good judgment reflects good character.
Without the redemptive powers of character, Kronman declares,
lawyers lose faith in the ideal of professional excellence. To restore
faith in character and to regain a high standard of professional excellence,' 7 he seeks to "rescue" the ideal of the lawyer-statesman
from "collapse.' 8 For Kronman, the lawyer-statesman represents a
"classical figure" marked by "great" wisdom in counseling, "exceptional" powers of advocacy, and an abiding commitment to the public good (pp. 12-13). Kroman culls examples of this figure from
the nineteenth-century careers of Daniel Webster, Rufus Choate,
John Marshall, Fisher Ames, William Pinkney, and James Kent,19 as
well as from the twentieth-century careers of Dean Acheson, John
McCloy,
Adlai Stevenson, Cyrus Vance, Paul Warnke, and Carla
20
Hills.

These lawyers exemplify the virtues of wisdom, excellence,

and civic spirit, possessing a "special talent" of judgment and lead14. P. 3. Kronman defends his roster of "outstanding" lawyers by exalting the substance
of their judicial opinions in selected cases. But he declines to establish a clear correlation
between the quality of lawyer counsel and the soundness of judicial decisionmaking. Further,
he neglects to set forth criteria guiding the selection of certain cases over others.
15. Pp. 2, 225. Kronman, PracticalWisdom and Professional Character,supra note 3, at
206 (describing practical wisdom as a "central requirement" of the practice of law); see also
Kronman, Living in the Law, supra note 3, at 841 ("To practice law well requires not only a
formal knowledge of the law (a knowledge of what the legal realists termed the 'paper' rules
or rules 'on the books') but certain qualities of mind and temperament as well.") (footnote
omitted).
16. P. 3. Kronman, PracticalWisdom and Professional Character,supra note 3, at 208
(positing the "connection between cognition and character").
17. Kronman's confessed aim is to provide a "compelling" account of the lawyer-statesman ideal as a "conception of professional excellence." Pp. 13-14. To do so, he endeavors to
articulate the "intellectual premises" of that ideal, reconstructing it "from the bottom up." P.
14.
18. Pp. 5, 354. Historical rescue carries the risk of overbreadth: it may salvage both
honorable and "shameful" aspects of the profession. P. 5. Although Kronman admits to the
profession's "obviously" shameful history of "racial, religious, and sexual exclusivity," he
seems to consign such "failings" to the "past." P. 5. Indeed, for Kronman, the shame of
exclusion and the failure of inclusion apparently have been "overcome." P. 5.
19. P. 12. Kronman finds "distinguished representatives" of the lawyer-statesman ideal
"in every age of American law." P. 3. But see Altman, supra note 8, at 1056, 1059 ("By the
turn of the century, the republican ideal of the lawyer-statesman existed mostly in lawyers'
memories.").
20. Pp. 11-12,283. Kronman also mentions Lloyd Garrison, Orville Schell, William Rogers, and Henry Stimson. Given this yardstick, no doubt Uoyd Cutler and Abner Mikva deserve mention as well. Both are accomplished private counselors and public servants, and,

1208

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1204

ership that coincides with the public good (pp. 12, 14, 49).
Although this talent also extends to matters of "private" interest,
the principal purpose of such "outstanding" lawyers is to "help"
their clients "come to a better understanding of their own ambitions, interests, and ideals and to guide their choice among alternative goals" (p. 15).
The "outstanding" qualities of Kronman's lawyer-statesmen
stem from character. Good character, he contends, gives rise to an
"excellence of judgment" beyond simple "intellectual skill" (p. 35).
Judgment endows "some citizens" with "a superior ability to discern the public good" (p. 35). This superiority, a sign of "human
excellence," holds "special meaning for lawyers as a group" (p.
109). Unlike other
citizens, they appreciate the value of
"connoisseurship. "' 21
Connoisseurs, Kronman explains, are persons "devoted" to the
attainment of a certain "good" regardless of "form" (p. 139). This
dispositional character, a quality expressed in "habitual feelings and
desires," shapes professional judgment (p. 15). Good lawyers,
Kronman asserts, are connoisseurs of the law; they care for "the
good of the law itself" (p. 139). Civic-minded devotion to the law's
"well-being" enables lawyers to excel in making accurate predictions of judicial outcomes (p. 139).
Prediction requires foresight. Kronman posits foresight as a
character trait of practical wisdom. He defines foresight as "the capacity to see ahead, to anticipate in imagination the consequences
and actual experience of following each of the different pathways
that one might choose" (p. 86). To be sure, connoisseurs practice
more than foresight; they practice an art. The lawyer-statesman
practices the art of statesmanship.
On Kronman's account, the art of great statesmanship entails
two qualities or traits: "love of the public good" and "wisdom in
deliberating about it" (p. 54). He locates the "public virtue" of
statesmanship in the community leader of "exceptional wisdom and
skill" who serves "the good of the community" (pp. 53-54). The
statesman's "special virtue" lies in his "extraordinary devotion" to
the good of his community and in his "superior capacity for discerning" the nature of that good (p. 54). In essence, statesmanship symbolizes "a kind of skill or excellence at making judgments about the
public good" (p. 87).
Kronman discovers the statesman's "excellence" of public, deliberative judgment in "political debates" concerning community
moreover, both are male. Kronman never satisfactorily explains the gendered nature of his
professional yardstick.
21. Kronman cites the judgments of a connoisseur "as a benchmark for the opinion of
others." P. 139. He takes these judgments "to be more reliable and on the whole to reflect a
better and more informed view of the aims of the enterprise in question." P. 139.
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ideals, particularly the "best" means to achieve certain ends (pp.
54-55, 61). He views means-based disputes as a "problem of counting" that commands a "calculative" judgment.22 Good judgment
hinges on "the ability to calculate" the "right choice" of means in a
situation of conflicting ends and incommensurable values (pp. 56,
58-61). The statesman's "excellence" of deliberative judgment is
most vivid in cases in which community identity is in controversy. 2
The complexity of identity-based political judgments leads
Kronman to explore the counterpart of statesmanship in the realm
of personal deliberation. 24 Analogizing personal and political styles
of deliberation, he detects a "structural resemblance" and "correspondence" in identity-defining choices about individual and community values (pp. 63, 65-66, 88-89). Kronman maintains that "lifedefining choice" situations constitute an important class of value
dilemmas involving deliberation about incomparable goods (p. 66).
He assigns to the human imagination a crucial role in that deliberative inquiry, especially the imaginative ability "to anticipate the
costs and benefits of each alternative" (p. 69).
Imagination, Kronman reveals, permits other-directed sympathy
(pp. 70-71). The imaginative "elaboration" or "mimicking" of another's value commitments 25 evokes an attitude of "suspended
identification" that combines the dispositions of compassion and
detachment in a posture "less disinterested" than observation "but
more detached than love" (pp. 70-73). Compassion describes the
dispositional power of "generating feelings" (p. 74). Detachment
denotes the temperamental power of "moderating or confining feelings" (p. 74). Kronman classifies the affective habits of sympathy
and detachment as "traits of character" (p. 76). Lawyers endowed
with these traits enjoy "enlarged imaginative powers" and "wider
access to the realm of surrogate experience" conducive to deliberative judgment. 26 In this sense, deliberation is "bifocal" in nature (p.
72).
22. P. 55. Kronman comments that "the skill most needed in deliberating about means
will be the ability to count costs with accuracy and speed." P. 55.
23. Kronman emphasizes that the excellence of deliberative judgment comes not from
the "ability to determine what is right (for there may be no neutral standpoint from which
the alternatives can be assessed) or to discover opportunities for compromise (since none
may exist)," but from the "ability to advance more reliably than others the good of political
fraternity." P. 93.
24. Kronman denotes personal deliberation to mean "reflection in which an individual
engages when attempting to define his or her own good and to determine how it may be
achieved." P. 62.
125. Mimicking seeks to "anticipate" the experience of casting a choice "by reproducing in
oneself in a provisional form the cares and concerns of someone who has already made it and
then by asking what it would be like to live that person's life." P. 74.
26. P. 76. Kronman acknowledges that "some feminist writers have argued that there is a
closer connection between feeling and judgment than is commonly supposed." P. 166.
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Notwithstanding the naturalistic origins of character, Kronman
argues that lawyers can "learn" the attitude of "detached compassion"27 informing the "art of deliberation" through a process of dispositional education in affective "discipline and training." 28 The
habitual mixing of the affective dispositions of compassion and detachment produces a kind of "virtuoso of feeling. ' 29 Because "only
some possess" that quality of feeling, however, Kronman confesses
that deliberative excellence is irreconcilable with political
equality.30
Kronman tolerates the elitist and undemocratic import of the
deliberative component of practical wisdom in order to fashion a
method that attains "a deeper quasi-experiential understanding" of
incomparable alternatives.3 1 Practical wisdom, he professes, furnishes both a procedural and a substantive method of achieving
"excellence in deliberating about ends." 32 Procedurally, it facilitates deliberation about incommensurable values (pp. 86-87). Sub27. P. 85. The attitude of detached compassion brings neither regret nor self-deception
but "neutrality." Pp. 83-84. To Kronman, the condition of regret "divides a person against
himself." P. 79. He dismisses the "strategy of forgetting" as a method to avoid or to combat
the "self-condemnation of regret." Pp. 82-83.
28. Pp. 15, 75, 304. The object of learning detached compassion by this process is "to
force the person undergoing it to entertain the widest possible diversity of points of view, and
to explore these in a mood of deepening sympathy, while retaining the spirit of aloofness on
which sound judgment also critically depends." P. 304. Menkel-Meadow calls this process
"empathy training." Menkel-Meadow, supranote 8, at 620. Although she distinguishes sympathy from empathy, she likewise asserts that the "affective aspects of lawyering can be
taught and learned." Id at 606, 620.
29. Pp. 75, 108. The virtuoso experiences the dispositions of sympathy and detachment as
"stable features of [his] personality," hence he is "likely to deliberate well, not just on occasion but consistently in different settings." P. 76.
30. Pp. 51, 108. Kronman approves the Aristotelian notions of "superior ability" and
"character-based elitism," thus endorsing a theory of "inequality in the capacity for selfrule." P. 42. To Kronman, inequality stems from an inferior deliberative capacity. See ARIs.
TOTLE, NIcoMAcsAN ETmIcs 6K.VI, ch. 9 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds. & David Ross
trans., rev. ed. 1980) (1925) (observing differences in deliberative capacity); see also Miriam
Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-OrientedLegal Theory and the Moral Foundation of DeliberativeDemocracy, 82 CAL L. REv. 331,387-88 (1994) (explaining Aristotle's
notion of superiority in citizenship); Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 TEXAs L.
RFv. 971, 1007-11 (1992) (discussing Aristotle's vision of social hierarchy and inequality);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Comments, 66 CQ.-KmEr L. REv. 213,220-22 (1990) (mentioning Aristotle's conception of natural capabilities). Compare Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LmERAUSM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce Douglass et al.
eds., 1990)
(approving elements of the Aristotelian conception of social democracy) with Michael Slote,
Law in Virtue Ethics, 14 LAw & PntL 91, 93-94 (1995) (decrying contemporary Aristotelian
approaches to political philosophy for their seeming unwillingness or inability "to defend
democratic or liberal ideas of justice").
31. P. 74. To acquire this quasi-experiential understanding, Kronman imparts, lawyers
"must be able to sustain the conflicting attitudes of compassion and detachment." P. 74.
32. Pp. 86,161. Kronman's notion of excellence "presupposes specific traits of character"
including "the disposition to conserve." P. 161. Out of this disposition, he extracts "a reverence for the variety of irreconcilable human goods and for the genius of unprincipled invention that has made it possible for people to live together despite the incomparability of their
conceptions of what is valuable in life." P. 162.
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stantively, it achieves the "deeper self-knowledge" 3 and the "selfdirected friendship" of integrity, a "substantive good" of "intrinsic
worth" (p. 87).
Practical wisdom, Kronman maintains, enables "outstanding"
lawyers to render personal and political judgments even when alternative ideals stand incommensurable (p. 97). In the personal
sphere, "wise judgment" tends to "promote the condition of integrity" (p. 97). In the political
sphere, that judgment works to foster
"political fraternity." 34 Here again, the statesman's wisdom or deliberative excellence is both substantive and procedural (pp. 99100), for he endeavors to build or preserve
"fraternity"35 through
'36
pluralism.
"empathic
of
pursuit
the
Kronman believes that individuals achieve a condition of political fraternity when they overcome their differences to join in a deliberative debate about the identity and ends of their community (p.
93). To meet this formal condition, 37 community members must
33. For Kronman, self-knowledge goes beyond informed choice, even though "informed
choice is an intrinsic as well as instrumental good." Pp. 68-69. Self-knowledge aims higher,
striving to attain a kind of "enlightened understanding." P. 68. At this level, self-knowledge
seems to encompass both the "choices or preferences of good individuals" and an "awareness
of the good." See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., In Praiseof a Gentle Sou; 10 J.L. & REuGION 279, 289 (1993-94) (surveying the work of Thomas Shaffer).
34. P. 97. Kronman adverts to political fraternity as "friendship among citizens."
Anthony Kronman, Aristotle's Idea of PoliticalFraternity,24 AM. J. Jums. 114, 126 (1979).
He states:
it is the sign of a wise political judgment that it promotes community, not through the
construction of a false and unattainable unanimity, but in the only way that human beings with strongly divergent interests are ever likely to achieve it: by strengthening the
capacity of each to entertain the views of those with whom he disagrees, a capacity that
has traditionally gone under the name of political fraternity.
Kronman, Living in the Law, supra note 3, at 861.
35. To Kronman, the statesman "is wise because he deliberates in a certain way, and wise
also because his deliberations lead, more reliably than others', to the good of political fraternity." P. 100.
36. Pp. 102, 105. The statesman relies on the art of rhetoric to encourage the "sentiment
of fellow-feeling" that builds pluralist community. P. 101. The "performative character" of
rhetoric actualizes, through "affective conversion," the empathic relations of brotherhood
and community in practice. Id. See Kronman, Aristotle's Idea of PoliticalFraternity,supra
note 34, at 138 ("The relation of brotherhood therefore provides a peculiarly appropriate
foundation upon which to build the hybrid institutions of political fraternity.").
37. David Trubek mentions Kronman's preference for a "formal legal system." David M.
Trubek, Reconstructing Max Weber's Sociology of Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 919, 931 (1985)
(reviewing Am-moNy T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983)); see also Nancy L. Schwartz, Max
Weber's Philosophy, 93 YALE L.J. 1386, 1388 (1984) (reviewing KRONMAN, supra)
("Kronman wants to argue that one mode of legal thought, formal rationality, is particularly
privileged in Weber's system.").
Kronman's early work is replete with references to formal rationality. See, e.g., Thomas
H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE LJ. 1, 37
(1975) (calling for "the fair and uniform application" of Uniform Commercial Code policies
intended to protect the financing buyer in commercial transactions); Thomas H. Jackson &
Anthony T. Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protection of the Expectation Interest, 60
MnN. L. REv. 971, 982 (1976) (applying "an objective theory of preferences" in bankruptcy
to the treatment of security interests in after-acquired property); Anthony T. Kronman, A
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combine the statesman's deliberative arts of compassion and detachment in a "spirit of affectionate good will" (p. 96). The spirit of
"civic friendship" registers political fraternity "midway between tolunion," a spirit "every member of a community" may
erance and
38
celebrate.
Kronman compares the community value of political fraternity
with the individual value of personal integrity. 39 Political fraternity,
he contends, establishes "bonds of fellow-feeling" among the members of a community, "bonds based upon their willingness to sympathize with each other's interests and concerns" (p. 96). Those
bonds protect communities against the "destructive force" of "identity-defining moments" (p. 96). Political fraternity consequently
"preserve[s] communities against disintegration" in the same way
that personal integrity "preserves the souls of individuals" through
friendship. 40
Kronman asserts that the values implanted in political fraternity
animate the three different "jobs" of practicing lawyers: judging,
counseling, and advocacy. 41 Despite the discrete nature of each
job, he regards all three as a single intertwined practice of deliberative wisdom and civic-mindedness. 42 Kronman argues that "all
New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 421 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACr As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRAcrUAL OBLIGATION (1981)) (noting

that the "incentive effects" of a contract rule "will be undermined if the rule is applied in an
ad hoc and unpredictable manner").
Although these references may pledge Kronman to a system of formal rationality, they do
not foreclose a commitment to distributive justice. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law
and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE LJ. 472, 475 (1980) (defending the use of contract rules to
implement distributional goals).
38. Pp. 99-100. Kronman imagines civic friendship arising out of a state of nature in
which parties "develop sympathy, affection, or love for one another." Anthony T. Kronman,
Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 21 (1985).
39. P. 95. Kronman defines personal integrity as "the condition of wholeness that results
when the parts of a person's soul are ... on amicable terms, when one's present attachments
are not at war with past ones, or engaged in a subtler context of repression and revenge,
despite the irreconcilable differences that set them apart." P. 95.
40. P. 96. Political fraternity, for Kronman, "is thus a preeminent good that in most circumstances exceeds all others in importance." P. 106.
41. Pp. 113-122. Compare Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 605 n.58 (rebuffing
Kronman's vision of professionalism as "nostalgically" litigation-oriented).
42. Pp. 121-22. Altman charges that Kronman "falls to acknowledge that the litigator's
partisan role subordinates the judicial point of view, thereby distorting the exercise of practical wisdom." Altman, supra note 8, at 1067. Kronman admits that advocacy encourages a
kind of instrumental "cynicism" with respect to truth claims. Anthony Kronman, Foreword:
Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE LJ. 955, 964 (1981). He traces this cynicism to the influence of "an education in advocacy." Id. at 965. Even though he makes no
explicit mention of it, Kronman seems to regard the clinical method of legal education as a
highly instrumental form of advocacy education. The noninstrumental content of recent
clinical and practice-based literature demonstrates that he underestimates the field. See, eg.,
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse,77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1298 (1992); Binny Miller, Give Them
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrativein Case Theory, 93 MiCH. L. REv. 485 (1994);
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
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practicing lawyers must deliberate about their clients' ends and not
just about the means for reaching them" (p. 146). Additionally, he
contends that all lawyers "must be connoisseurs of judging moved
by a concern for the good of the law itself" (p. 146).
To Kronman, lawyers and judges serve differentiated roles "inside a common practice" (p. 135). Like judges, lawyers - both as
counselors and as advocates - require an "attitude" of civic-mindedness sufficient to assess "the good of the legal order as a whole" 43
and "the good of the community that the laws establish and affirm." 44 Such an assessment "compels" lawyers to "neutralize" the
value of client welfare in deference to the "soundness" of law and
legal order (pp. 142, 145). When moral conflicts arise involving
competing loyalties to a client and a court of law, 45 the good lawyer's public-spirited devotion to the law and legal order prevails.
Kronman holds that civic-minded judgments warrant a particular form of wise deliberation he calls "third-personal deliberation."'46 The starting point of third-personal deliberation
is the "imaginative assumption" of a "foreign," that is client,
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence:
Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1721 (1994) (book review).
43. P. 141; see also Kronman, Living in the Law, supranote 3, at 870-71 (noting that "an
advocate who sees things from the judge's perspective and attends to his concerns will be
careful to frame his own arguments so as to emphasize the congruence between his client's
interests and the interests of the legal community as a whole").
44. P. 141. Adoption of the judicial attitude of civic-mindedness, Kronman claims, enables lawyers to predict more accurately the behavior of judges. P. 138. This attitude is
crucial "where there is no clear doctrinal tendency, or competing precedents of roughly equal
weight." P. 137. In these circumstances, "a lawyer has no choice but to decide for himself
what the legally correct decision would be and to base his prediction of judicial behavior on
the judgment that he reaches." P. 137.
45. P. 146. Kronman's insight that ethical "bounds" allow "a divergence between the
client's well-being and that of the law itself" echoes David Wilkins's trenchant observations
in his study of legal realism and ethics. P. 144. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1990). Wilkins observes that the legal realist claim of rule
indeterminacy "directly challenges" the assertion found in the traditional model of legal ethics that "legal boundaries effectively mediate between a lawyer's private duty to clients and
her public commitments to the legal framework." Id. at 470. Extending the realist thesis, he
argues that "indeterminacy threatens to collapse the distinction between the lawyer's public
responsibility to obey the law and her private responsibility to represent her client effectively." ld. at 476. Lawyers, according to Wilkins, hold "both the power and the incentive to
manipulate the very boundaries that are supposed to provide an independent source of [ethical] constraint." Id. at 497.
46. P. 130. The process of "third-personal deliberation" directs a lawyer "to place himself
in the client's position by provisionally accepting his ends and then imaginatively considering
the consequences of pursuing them, with the same combination of sympathy and detachment
the lawyer would employ if he were deliberating on his own account." P. 130. Once a lawyer
assumes the client's standpoint, "he proceeds just as if he were attempting to answer a personal question for himself." P. 131. Compare Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 620 (recommending that "lawyers need to learn to experience 'the other' from the values that the other
holds, not those of the lawyer").
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stance.4 7 That "preliminary act of imagination" encourages lawyerclient "cooperative deliberation," at times even friendship, 48 without sacrificing a lawyer's independent judgment. 49 Kronman applies the notion of third-personal deliberation to the core and
periphery of client cases. 50 Lawyers, he notes, handle both sets of
cases by emulating the traits of deliberative wisdom and civic-mindedness exhibited by the connoisseur of judging, particularly a devotion to the law's "internal good. '51 Their objective is "to preserve
and perfect the community of law" by uniting "professional competence" and "public-spiritedness" (pp. 127, 150-54).
Kronman traces this collective ambition to the case method of
law school instruction. 52 He asserts that the case method "nourish[es]" and "promotes" the character traits of deliberative wisdom
and public-spiritedness, as well as the ensuing "tendency to take a
conservative view of law and politics. '53 He defines the dispositional attitude of conservatism in terms of caution, skepticism, prag47. P. 130. To be effective in that assumption, "a lawyer must be able to lose himself in
that other person's situation, to see it from within in a way that makes it possible for him not
just to name but to appreciate the interests, values, and ambitions that inform it." P. 299.
48. Pp. 130-32. Kronman places friendship "in a mean between sympathy and detachment." P. 132; see also Kronman, PracticalWisdom and ProfessionalCharacter,supranote 3,
at 225 ("A practically wise counselor, then, is distinguished from a legal technician by his
sense of fit and by his capacity to act as a critical friend .. ").
49. Pp. 130-31. Kronman distinguishes third-personal deliberation from alternative client
or lawyer-centered forms of deliberation. He states: "The lawyer's third-personal deliberations yield an independent judgment concerning the soundness of the client's decision, a
judgment that is in principle distinguishable both from the client's declared views and the
conclusion the lawyer would reach starting from his own personal values instead ... ." Pp.
130.
50. P. 133. Kronman places in his core category cases involving client impetuosity or selfdoubt and cases in which a client's ends conflict or suffer from vagueness. These situations,
he notes, "constitute a significant portion of the problems with which lawyers deal, including
some of the most interesting and important ones." Pp. 133-34.
51. P. 151. Kronman adds that the "outstanding" advocate also must aspire to be a "connoisseur of cooperation" in private negotiations, for negotiations entail a "communitarian
dimension" expressed in the attitude of public-spiritedness and in the creation of "transactional communities." P. 153.
52. Menkel-Meadow points to the deficiencies of the case method in teaching the skills of
"legislating, lobbying and administering laws." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 616; see
also Richard B. Stewart, Foreword- Lawyers and the Legislative Process, 10 HARV. J. oN
LEGIS. 151, 156-57 (1973) (commenting that law schools "have largely neglected the training
of lawyers in legislative roles" due to their "continued emphasis" on the study of judge-made
rules and judicial decisions).
For gender and race-grounded critiques of the case method of law school pedagogy, see
Kimber6 W. Crenshaw, Foreword. Toward a Race-ConsciousPedagogy in Legal Education,
11 NATL. BLACK LJ. 1, 1-10 (1989) (elucidating the "illusion" of racial objectivity and neutrality fostered by the dominant pedagogical norm of "perspectivelessness"); Catherine Weiss
& Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1332-55
(1988) (describing gendered experience of public silencing in the law school classroom).
53. Compare pp. 122,128,154-55 with Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Trainingfor
Hierarchy,in THE PoLrms oF LAW: A PROGRESSIV CRrIQUE 40 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed.
1990) (denouncing legal education as ideological training in the structures of hierarchy);
Mary O'Brien & Sheila McIntyre, PatriarchalHegemony and Legal Education, 2 CAN. J.
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matism, gradualism, and a cosmopolitan appreciation for the
multiplicity and irreconcilability of moral perspectives on the value
of human goods.5 4 To illustrate this attitude, he cites the conservatism implicit in the culture of judging and the habits of "judiciousness" (p. 318). In the judge's perspective Kronman sees a
commitment to tradition and to the good of the law itself.5 5 This
commitment allows judges to enjoy the "intrinsic pleasure" of de56
liberation "well done" (p. 319). The bureaucratization of courts,
however, transforms the nature and institutional culture of judging,
sapping the joy of deliberation (p. 320).
The bureaucratic competition between the virtues of efficiency
and wisdom in the adjudicative, branch, Kronman complains,
reduces "the ancient art of judging into a species of office management" (p. 4). He attributes this transformation to the "enormous
number of cases" and "accelerating demands" of adjudication. The
demand for adjudication, and the corresponding need to "expand
the output of judicial services," exacts "changes in the structure,
tempo, and style of adjudication" (pp. 321-23). These changes give
rise to a managerial style of judicial decisionmaking "more precipitous and prone to personal bias" (p. 324).
Kronman contends that the bureaucratization of the judiciary
and the emergence of a managerial ethos harm the activity of judging by "stifling" the "deliberative imagination." 57 Managerial adjudication, he insists, is "less deliberative in character" and, therefore,
less reliant on a judge's "imaginative powers" (p. 326). As a result,
judges experience the "enfeeblement" of their imagination. 58 The
WoMEN & L. 69, 79 (1986) (describing the "authoritative pedagogy" of the classroom as
"inhospitable to student criticism or innovative ideas").
54. P. 159. See Kronman, PracticalWisdom and Professional Character,supra note 3, at
225-26 ("The man of practical wisdom, as we usually conceive him, is a cautious man, attached to existing institutions and inclined to alter them only through a process of slow interstitial adjustment of the sort, for example, that has characterized the development of the
common law.").
55. P. 318. Kronman discerns that commitment in the judge's pursuit of "the good of
political fraternity." P. 319.
56. Kronman conducts a broader analysis of the bureaucratization of modern political
institutions in his study of Max Weber. Compare ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, MAX WEBER 37-

71, 166-88 (1983) with Joan Tronto, Law and Modernity: The Significance of Max Weber's
Sociology of Law, 63 TEXAS L. Rnv. 565 (1984) (reviewing KRONmAN, supra) (assailing
Kronman for seriously misunderstanding Weber's sociology of law).
57. P. 325. By deliberative imagination, Kronman means "the capacity to entertain a
point of view defined by interests, attitudes, and values different from one's own without
actually endorsing it." Pp. 326. Attaining that quality of imagination "takes time, and even
once attained needs continual exercise to remain supple and strong." Pp. 327.
58. P. 326. The "monocularity" of judging, Kronman adds, aggravates the condition of
enfeeblement. Pp. 325-28. This deterioration is noteworthy among federal judges who view
cases from the "perspective" of a subordinate, such as a clerk or a special master. P. 328.
The "prior judgment" implicit in that perspective imposes a "harmonizing order" on conflicting party claims and, tfius, reduces the need for deliberation. P. 327.
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"economizing strategy" and "commensurating attitude" of managerial judges, manifested in the effort to maximize the good of justice, 59 further weaken the judicial imagination. 60 Judicial
statesmanship, Kronman warns, demands the imaginative capacity
to accept not only the fact of "human disagreement," but also the
tragedy of incommensurable moral and political claims (p. 341).
The "tragic" burden of judicial statesmanship carries the "obligation to pursue political fraternity" in the face of incommensurable
conflicts (pp. 340-42). Because Kronman's definition of political
fraternity privileges the value of tradition as a safeguard against the
"forces" of social "disorder," fulfilling that obligation in judging,
counseling, or advocacy necessitates "a commitment to order and
the status quo" (p. 108).
Kronman's conservative commitment to the political fraternity
of the prevailing order implies a "lawyer-centered" 61 vision of deliberative judgment. Only lawyers, indeed only elite large-firm corporate lawyers, possess the mind and character of good judgment.
Evidently, clients, third parties, and the public are too easily swayed
by base or populist impulses to be entrusted with the heavy burdens
of judgment. Endowed with a natural ability to ascertain the public
good, Kronman's lawyer-statesmen rise above selfish and popular
sentiment independently to pursue wise ends, even when reaching a
particular end result demands incommensurable value choices.
Although lawyers experience the necessity of hard choices in
their personal decisionmaking, the common fact of incommensurability does not compel the incorporation of personal and professional styles of deliberation in practical legal judgments. 62 To the
Several judge-administered developments are hastening the decline in deliberation.
Kronman cites, for example, the tendency to limit the availability of oral argument and to
rely on staff summaries of briefs, as well as the practice of issuing separate or clerk-drafted
opinions. Pp. 329-30. The splintering of opinions into a "plurality of voices," Kronman explains, undermines political "order" and "fraternity." Pp. 343-45. Furthermore, the spread
of clerk-drafted opinions injects an "immaturity" and an antiprudentialist bias into the deliberative process. Pp. 347, 351.
59. Kronman avers that "the maximand of judging is justice." P. 335.
60. Pp. 337-42. Kronman argues that the economic calculation of justice maximization
"obscures the deliberative nature of adjudication and promotes a false understanding of the
judge's task and of the capacities needed to do it well." P. 338. Specifically, an economic
calculus suggests that party claims may "always be commensurated without recharacterizing
them in a way that alters their essential meaning." Pp. 338, 340. Recharacterization becomes
more likely, Kronman states, when adjudication shifts "from legal disputes that involve only
a struggle for money to those that represent a fight over basic norms of personal and political
morality." P. 340. Because this shift uncovers the "underlying" conflict between incommensurable values, recharacterization fails as a mediating strategy of rationalization. P. 340.
61. I borrow the term from David Wilkins. See David B. Wilkins, PracticalWisdom for
PracticingLawyers: SeparatingIdealsfrom Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv. L. REy. 458,
459 (1994) (reviewing Tsm LosT LAWYER).

62. See Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759, 1768
(1993) (asserting that "practical judgment in legal practice cannot simply be assimilated to
practical judgment more generally").
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extent that they carry role-differentiated responsibilities, professional judgments ought to be different from the personal judgments
of private individuals and, moreover, the political judgments of
public statesmen. 63 This normative distinction rests on the nature
of the autonomy-based professional responsibilities that attach to
the lawyer's role both as an advocate and as an officer of the court.
Kronman's dedication to elite lawyer independence permits but
does not command a lawyer-centered vision of private or public deliberation. The notion of professional autonomy licenses alternative forms of deliberation: client-centered as well as law-centered.
David Wilkins observes, for example, that the lawyer's role of private advocate allows a "collaborative enterprise" of deliberation in
which the lawyer and client engage in a "meaningful exchange of
information and values." 64 Moreover, Wilkins points out that the
lawyer's role of public officer involves a rule-bound, institutional
notion of deliberation extrinsic to personal decisionmaking but crucial to public accountability. 65 Nevertheless, Kronman imagines the
autonomous lawyer-statesman to be largely free of client and institutional constraints in rendering practical counsel. For Kronman,
freedom is contingent on tradition: the lawyer-statesman is free to
pursue self-styled moral virtue provided he keeps within the boundaries of traditional ideals.
II. PRUDENTIALISM

Kronman's deference to tradition follows from his "common66
law reverence" for the virtues of practical wisdom and prudence.
Like the common lawyer, he decries "abstract speculation," 67 baring a "deep distrust of theory and theoreticians." 68 Unsurprisingly,
he derides the law and economics and critical legal studies (CLS)
movements for their antagonism toward the concept of prudence
embedded in the common law tradition of advocacy and
adjudication. 69
63. Wilkins makes a similar point. See Wilkins, supra note 61, at 468.
64. Id. at 470-71, 474.

65. Id. at 471.
66. P. 21. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567, 1605 (1985) ("Lawyers in the common law tradition have always regarded
prudence in the way Bickel did, as a virtue of an especially important sort, indispensable to
the practice of their craft in all its registers, from the counseling and representation of individual clients to the governance of states.").
67. But see Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEXAS L.
REv. 1139, 1156 (1995) (remarking that Kronman's method "eschews context in favor of
abstraction").
68. Pp. 21, 316. For Kronman, deliberative wisdom is found "in a knowledge of particulars" rather than in a "general theory." P. 319.
69. See also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CoRnmLL L. Rlv. 1, 2 (1986) ("But
neither [law and economics nor critical legal studies] is willing to take law on its own terms,

1218

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1204

Building on Alexander Bickel's political philosophy, 70 Kronman
takes prudence to be "a trait or characteristic that is at once an
intellectual capacity and a temperamental disposition."'71 In this
sense, prudentialism signals a quality of "mind and character." 72
The prudentialist tradition accepts the "plurality" and "incommensurability" of human goods (pp. 238, 247). That acceptance,
Kronman indicates, in no way bars judges or lawyers from seeking
"to deliberate rationally about the choice" among competing goods
(p. 57). The fact of incommensurability simply renders such a
Prudentialists confront the complexity of
choice morally complex.
"moral pluralism"73 in searching out a "pragmatically tolerable accommodation" among conflicting goods (p. 238). The point is to
frame "reasonable solutions" to local, practical problems (p. 266).
Similar to practical wisdom, prudence is "a trait of character and
not just a cognitive skill" (p. 21).
Kronman links prudentialism to the "moral-educative function"
of law school training, especially the case method of instruction (pp.
109, 116). He treats that method "as an instrument for the development of moral imagination" designed to provoke a "bifocality" of
sympathies, understandings, and attitudes informed by lawyer partisanship and judicial neutrality (p. 113). The methodological interplay of partisanship and neutrality fashions a "complex exercise in
advocacy and detachment" that confers "new perceptual habits"
and enhances "empathic understanding" (pp. 113-15).
Kronman expounds that the moral-educative content of the case
method provides a counterweight to academic relativism. He extols
the "public-spirited stoicism" 74 of the judicial attitude for demonstrating the need for civic-minded, reasoned judgment under conditions of "maximum moral ambiguity" (pp. 117-18). The case
method fosters the "transference" of this neutral dispositional trait
through student mimicking of the judicial role (p. 119). Kronman
ties the crisis in the legal profession to the failed dispositional transference of prudentialism in legal education. Transference, he oband to accept adjudication as an institutional arrangement in which public officials seek to
elaborate and protect the values that we hold in common.").
70. For an overview of Bickel's political philosophy, see ALEXANDER M. BxcrnL, THm
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (2d ed. 1986); ALEXANDER M. BICKEr., THE MoRALrrY OF
CONSENT (1975); ALEXANDER M. BxKKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
71. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Jurisprudence,supra note 66, at 1569.
72. Id. at 1614-15.
73. Kronman puts forward an account of pluralism that "sees many different conflicts not
all reducible to one titanic struggle and accepts that there is often no proper solution to these
conflicts, not even one that can only be intuited." P. 248. Under this account, "neither reason nor intuition" can establish a preeminent ranking of "competing claims." P. 248.
74. Kronman invokes the Roman term gravitas to describe this attitude. P. 118.
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serves, now tends toward the counterideal of the lawyer-policy
scientist (p. 316). Kronman unearths this counterideal in the "culture" of "university training" predominant in the postwar jurisprudential movements of law and economics and critical legal studies
(p. 316). He pronounces the law and economics movement the
"greatest influence on American academic law in the past quartercentury," much of it "hostile" to the ideal of the lawyer-statesman,75 and the CLS movement as a secondary but still detrimental
influence. 76
Kronman characterizes the law and economics and CLS movements as "antiprudentialist" in their depreciation of the value of
practical wisdom (pp. 167-68). He ascribes that hostility to the "scientific branch" of legal realism. 77 To explicate the aspirations,
methodologies, and antiprudentialist spirit of scientific realism,
Kronman dissects the Langdellian tendency to invent "a science of
law capable of determining with a high degree of precision both
what the law is and what it ought to be" (p. 169). He pinpoints this
tendency within a well-established tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence represented by John Austin, Jeremy Bentham, and
Thomas Hobbes.78 That tradition explicitly rejects an experiential,
common law model of legal education and professionalism founded
on the "practitioner's worldly wisdom" (pp. 174-75, 179).
Kronman gleans criticism of the Langdellian scientific tradition
from attacks mounted by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Jerome
Frank. He looks favorably upon Holmes's and Frank's efforts to
discredit Langdellianism, approving their treatment of adjudication as an independent, experiential, and discretionary process (pp.
189-90). Although he chides Frank's "essentially personal and
therapeutic" notions of human responsibility, self-conscious understanding, and enlightenment, Kronman seems to adopt Frank's
modernist sense of tragedy 79 and "celebration of mature
75. Kronman condemns the discipline of economics for denying "the phenomenon of
moral incommensurability," equating "judgment with calculation," and diminishing the value
of character and practical wisdom. P. 167.
76. Pp. 166-67. Kronman finds scientificrealism, law and economics, and critical legal
studies "linked" together "by a common contempt for the virtue of practical wisdom." P.
169.
77. P. 168. Kronman divides legal realism into scientific and prudentialist branches consistent with their differential analysis of practical wisdom in the study and administration of
law.
78. Pp. 174-75. Kromnan distinguishes Langdell's attempt to build a science of law inside
the implicit logic of the common law from Hobbes's, Austin's, and Bentham's efforts to construct a science of law outside the common law through rational legislative reorganization
and codification. Pp. 180-83.
79. On the modernist sense of tragedy in the practice of law, see Anthony V. Alfieri,
Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1241 (1992). Like the judge who accommodates the
"hard teaching" of uncertain and inevitably wrong judgments (pp. 193-94), the lawyer crafts-
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despair." 80 Kronman also garners criticism of Langdellian scientific

orthodoxy from the work of Karl Llewellyn, in spite of the scientific
realists' espousal of Llewellyn's original program of devising a
nonexperiential "systematic theory of law" (p. 196). Llewellyn's
later abandonment of that descriptive program and his return to the
common law craft tradition spurs Kronman to engraft the notion of
craft upon the Axistotelian idea of practical wisdom.81 The upshot
of that merger is the concept of prudentialism.
Kronman grasps prudentialism as a means to restore confidence
in the "reckonability of adjudication" (pp. 213-16). He operates on
the premise that adjudication contains internal descriptive and normative constraints that guide the interpretive process. s2 These disciplining constraints - doctrinal rules, traditions of work, habits of
thought, and filters of perception - render adjudication "reckonable to a pragmatically significant degree," albeit "not perfectly. '8 3
Nonetheless, the constraints permit a degree of reckonability sufficient to meet the practical needs of the good lawyer (pp. 218, 220,
223).
Disdainful of practical reason, the law and economics movement displaces the common law craft tradition of the lawyer-statesman with the antiprudentialist ideal of the lawyer-economist.
Kronman imputes this displacement to the rationalizing impulse of
man accommodates the imperfect and inexorably violent translation of a client's story into
legal discourse. Alfieri, supra at 1241.
80. Pp. 193-94,210. Martha Nussbaum captures this despair in describing the "difficulty"
of establishing "normative commitments" through practical reasoning. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About PracticalReason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714,
715 (1994).
81. Pp. 196-201, 209-25. Llewellyn defines craft in terms of tradition, responsibility, and
work. See KARL N. LLEwELLYN, Tsm COMMON LAW TRADTON: DECIDINO APPEALS 214
(1960). The work of the craftsman may stand steady or rise to "high artistry." Id. That
benchmark of reliability reflects "the existence of some significant body of working knowhow, centered on the doing of some perceptible kind of job." Id. The "healthy" craft, Llewellyn explains, "elicits ideals, pride, and responsibility in its craftsman." Id.
82. Interpretive constraints, Kronman submits, channel judicial discretion. See Anthony
T. Kronman, The Problem of JudicialDiscretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 481, 483 (1986) ("The
tradition of thought within which the judge is situated, and within whose horizon he encounters his task, constrains him in the discretionary decisions that he makes.").
83. P. 217. Kronman derives his notion of disciplining constraints from the work of Owen
Fiss and Stanley Fish. Compare, eg., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1339
(1984) (arguing that readers and texts "are structures of constraint, at once components of
and agents in the larger structure of a field of practices, practices that are the content of
whatever 'rules' one might identify as belonging to the enterprise") with Owen M. iss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L REV. 739, 744 (1982) (propounding the "idea of disciplining rules, which constrain the interpreter and constitute the standards by which the
correctness of the interpretation is to be judged"); see also Stanley Fish, Working on the
Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature; 60 TEXAS L. REV. 551, 562 (1982) (contending that "[iJnterpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and
not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, what will and will not be
heard as evidence, in a given enterprise"); Stanley Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 299,
313 (1983) (discussing the "epistemological necessity" of practice constraints).
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descriptive social science. A product of policy science, the lawyereconomist brings an efficiency-based normative standard to the incommensurable conflicts of adjudication (p. 228). This antiprudentialist standard, Kronman protests, mistakes empirical for
normative measures of judgment. Efficiency calculations, he continues, fail to make moral conflicts reckonable. 84
Kronman cites a similar antiprudentialist tendency prevalent in
the CLS movement, notably in the early writings of Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger (pp. 240-64). He construes this tendency
as an extension of the realist effort to overturn the Langdellian idea
of an autonomous, compelling, and neutral logic internal to the law.
Kronman is sympathetic to that effort, though not to its philosophi-

cal "methods and vocabulary. ' 85 Wary of the antiprudentialist bias
of scientific realism, he questions Kennedy's "rationally inarticulable confidence" in "right-minded" intuitive judgments (pp. 24748). He8 6finds Unger's project of "total criticism" even more
alarming.
Kronman perceives in Unger "a devotion to the philosophical
rationalization of all legal norms within a comprehensive scheme of
values based upon nonlegal principles of a highly abstract sort" (p.
249). That devotion, he explains, lends shape to "a general theory
of value capable of settling specific legal controversies in a system84. Pp. 234-35. Kronman's prior work shows a receptivity to the deployment of efficiency
or utilitarian principles in adjudication. See; eg., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143,1167 (1979)
(claiming that "a legal regime that recognizes the validity of after-acquired property clauses
is more efficient than one that does not"); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978) (justifying a contract rule of
unilateral mistake under a principle of efficiency); Anthony T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 748, 760, 774 (1980) (asserting that privacy claims generally "should be treated more democratically and denied the
status of 'trumps' that automatically defeat any competing interest of a 'merely economic'
sort"); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance 45 U. C. L. REv. 351, 381 (1978) (approving consideration of "economic sense" in contract law); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL S=U. 227,229 (1980) (maintaining that
"a combination of utilitarian and voluntarist principles best expresses our moral judgments
and best equips us to deal with the dilemmas of moral life").
85. P. 245. Kronman implicitly criticizes the CLS movement for fostering "an indifference to truth" in its scholarship. Kronman, Foreword.- Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, supra note 42, at 964. He states: "there is a profound difference between skepticism
about particular truth claims - a caution or reserve in accepting the asserted truth of particular propositions, especially those about human social life - and a cynical carelessness about
the effort to generate such propositions and to establish their validity." Id. at 965. Doubtless
he would extend that criticism to the postmodem strand of the CLS movement. See
Postmodernism and Law: A Symposium, 62 U. COLO.L. REv. 439 (1991).
86. See ROBERTO MANGABErRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrcs 2 (1975) ("Total
criticism arises from the inability of partial critiques of a system of thought to achieve their
objectives and from the desire to deal with the difficulties the partial critiques themselves
produce."). Kronman earlier denigrated Unger's claim of "total criticism." See Anthony T.
Kronman, Book Review, 61 MiNN. L. REv.167, 180, 195, 198 (1976) (reviewing UNGER,
supra).
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atic way" (p. 253). For Kronman, such a general, totalizing theory
amounts to "a normative science of law" (p. 253). Because any
form of scientific orthodoxy, even a "critical" policy science, conceals an "antiprofessional" bias and a "contempt" for practical expertise, the prudentialist tradition of the common-law practitioner
comes under threat.8 7 Kronman adduces proof of antiprudentialist
contempt in Unger's announcement of a lawyer's duty to "politicize" the law: "to turn low-level disputes that arise against a familiar and unquestioned background into controversies about that
background itself" (pp. 263-64). Left unchecked, Kronman cautions, Unger's "self-destructive" program of critical legal science invites "professional suicide," a result that threatens to "abolish the
profession" as a whole. 8
Kronman's embrace of the traditional canons of legal education
and the prudentialist tradition of the common law practitioner is
weakened by a lack of empirical support. There is scant evidence,
for example, that the case method of instruction inculcates the character trait of deliberative wisdom. Instead, because of its overreliance on appellate cases8 9 and its insensitivity to differences of
gender, 90 race, 91 and sexual orientation, 92 the case method seems to
87. Pp. 249, 261-64. Kronman chastises Unger for his abandonment of the "belief in a
distinctive legal expertise" that molds "the lawyer's sense of professional identity." P. 263.
88. Pp. 249, 264, 270. Kronnan infers that the politicization of doctrinal disputes explodes "any notion of a separate legal expertise" and, thus, portends "the destruction of the
very idea of a legal profession." P. 264.
89. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching ProfessionalJudgment, 69 WASH.
L. REv. 527, 532 (1994) (commenting that appellate cases "offer students little opportunity to
develop the skills of the legal counselor").
90. See Taunya L. Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988)
(assessing evidence of gender bias in the law school classroom environment, structure, and
language); Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLY.
& L. 23, 35 (1994) (noting that women students in the law school classroom "are deprived of
the ability to speak in the language that they have been socialized to speak"); Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptionsof Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL
EDuC. 311, 331 (1994) (reporting that "the self-esteem of far more women than of men is
lessened by the law school experience itself"); Cf. Robert Granfield, Contextualizingthe Different Voice Women, Occupational Goals, and Legal Education, 16 LAw & POLY. 1, 19
(1994) (finding that "women may possess multiple identities in law school that are mediated
by such contextual factors as occupational goals, race, and social class"); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organizationof Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621,640 (1994) (speculating that "there may be more variation among the individuals within a particular gender in
their legal behavior, than differences across gender"). See generally Suzanne Homer & Lois
Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1989-1990).

91. See Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculumin Legal Education, 79 CAL L.
REV. 1511 (1991) (discussing the integration of race into the core curriculum of legal
education).
92. See Jane S. Schacter, Poised at the Threshold: Sexual Orientation,Law, and the Law
School Curriculum in the Nineties, 92 MjcH. L. REV. 1910, 1927 (1994) (reviewing LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, An -rm LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993)) (remarking that study of sexual

orientation and the law illuminates "the regulation of sexuality and sexual activity more gen-
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inhibit the development of wisdom in deliberative judgment. Likewise, there is little evidence that critical legal science deviates from,
much less threatens, the tradition of common law practice.
Kronman's reproval of Unger's incitement to turn "low-level disputes" into "background" controversies in fact contradicts the settled tradition of law reform litigation invented by common law
practitioners.

IH.

CRAFr AND PUBLIC SERVICE

Fearing the reemergence of scientific orthodoxy in the guise of
the law and economics and CLS movements, Kronman invokes the
traditions of craft and public service. He employs these traditions
to show the deficiencies in the ideal of the lawyer-policy scientist.
That ideal recommends the "systematic study of the structures and
patterns" of law through an interdisciplinary application of a variety of methods borrowed at the outset from "economics, statistics,
political science, and philosophy" (p. 355). Kronman asserts "little
need" for "multidisciplinary social science" in private practice (p.
356). Moreover, he contends that the ideal of the policy scientist
undercuts the "value and distinctiveness of the lawyer's craft" expressed in the traditional techniques of analogy and distinction (pp.
356-57). Further, he argues that the ideal "lacks the depth and
human meaning" associated with the concept of character essential
to professional identity, pride, and personal meaning (pp. 356, 363).
To Kronman, the good lawyer possesses a distinctive character,
expertise, and "special imaginative powers" demonstrated in "the
art of handling cases." 93 The good lawyer deploys his expert knowledge of the law - legal rules and interpretive methods - and his
imaginative ability to refine the art of well-crafted deliberation for
its "own sake," not for "instrumental" purposes such "as a means
for making money" or of championing a public cause (pp. 300-01,
359-62). Kronman is attracted in this respect to Llewellyn's sense
of craft, especially the notion of horse sense: "the ability of those
erally, the relationship between legal rules and gender roles, the role of law in supporting or
suppressing difference, and the boundary line between individual and communal rights").
93. Pp. 359-63. For Kronman, law practice is "case-centered." Kronman, PracticalWisdom and Professional Character,supra note 3, at 205. The case frames "a kind of prism
which refracts the lawyer's more generalized doctrinal knowledge, and when he looks at the
law he always does so from the perspective of a case and through the medium of its dense
particularities." Id at 204; see also Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence,
supra note 66, at 1612 ("Lawyers are, by professional training, experts in the handling of
individual cases and not in the general design of institutions .

. . .").

For this reason,

Kronman declares, "no one except a lawyer is professionally competent to advise clients
about the law." P. 134. But see GERAL. P. L6nz, REBELLIOus LAWYERiNG: ONE CmCANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSWE LAW PRAcrncE 39-41, 55-56 (1992) (insisting that "the law-

yer is not necessarily better able than the client or others (professional or lay) to serve as
representative").
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who have mastered an activity to pursue it with subtlety and grace,
employing powers of discernment irreducible to rules" (p. 349).
The ambition of the lawyer-statesman is to "master" the art of craft
in the service of the public good. 94
Kronman calls for "a public-spirited concern for the good of the
law as a whole. 95 This concern requires lawyers to strike a "balance" between the imperatives of commerce or politics and the conflicting aspirations of professional idealism (pp. 316-17). Absent
that balance, professional idealism degenerates into mere "pretense
and puffery" (p. 317). Kronman commends the republican ideal of
the lawyer-engineer for its genuine dedication to public service (p.
22). He portrays that dedication as a "scientific" form of "publicspirited" problem-solving (pp. 18-20). Through civic-minded "scientific law reform," the lawyer-engineer advances the public
good. 96 But, for Kronman, public service entails more than the
civic-minded deliberation of the common good typical of any "exemplary citizen" or the strategic-minded calculation of political interest expected of a public cause lawyer. 97 Public service demands
the character and leadership distinctive of statesmen. The character of the lawyer-statesman rests on the noninstrumental virtue of
practical wisdom intrinsic to "a calling or vocation" (pp. 366-68).
Kronman is deeply wedded to the secular "idea of a calling, of
salvation through work" (p. 370). Work, he explains, not only ties
the individual to the "public world" but exerts a "transformative
effect" on the human personality, shaping character and identity
(pp. 368-69, 371). Personal fulfillment - the ability to establish a
meaningful place in the world - depends in substantial part on the
94. Pp. 316,350. See Kronman, Living in the Law, supranote 3, at 842 (asserting that any
lawyer who lacks a "public-spirited" view of law practice "is to that extent a professional
failure").
95. P. 167. Kronman argues that lawyers bear both the "general obligations" of citizenship and "certain special responsibilities, deriving from their status or position, to preserve
and perfect the legal institutions that in our society constitute a very large part of the public
order itself." Kronman, Living the Law, supra note 3, at 842 (footnote omitted).
96. Pp. 20-21. The lawyer-engineer, Kronman explains, practices a "science of law reform" out of a "general commitment to the public good." Pp. 19-20.
97. Pp. 17, 26-27, 33-35. Kronman contends that an instrumentalist attitude often motivates a public-spirited lawyer's practice. Kronman, Living in the Law, supra note 3, at 843.
The lawyer, for example, "may see himself merely as the instrument by which some commuAt the same time, Kronman admits, "a public-spirited lawnal good is to be achieved." Ld.
yer may find intrinsic satisfaction in his work if he believes that it not only leads to but
at 844. The tension between intrinsic
actually constitutes an element of the public good." ld.
and instrumental practice values transmits "character-forming consequences." Id. at 845.
Altman denies this tension, pointing out instead that public interest litigation presents
"opportunities to exercise public-spiritedness and practical wisdom" by allowing litigators to
"choos[e] clients in terms of their objectives" and to "require their clients to deliberate with
them about the moral or political issues raised during representation." Altman, supranote 8,
at 1069-70; see also Margulies, ProgressiveLawyering and Lost Traditions,supra note 67, at
1158 (claiming that public interest lawyers "dissolve" intrinsic-instrumental dichotomies).
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"meaning-giving power" of public institutions and professional
work (pp. 369-70). Kronman bemoans the "dramatic narrowing of
the possibilities of salvation within the realm of work" sparked by
the dissolution of traditional institutions and professional ideals (p.
372). Nevertheless, he is reluctant to give up the "demand for fulfillment" in the work of lawyers (p. 373). He points to the "sheer
quantity of time" and the "shifting" public-private spheres of commitment dictated by the practice of law (p. 373). Furthermore, he
notes that the idea of law as a calling "continues to be powerfully
affirmed" in legal education (p. 374).
Yet, Kronman's call for professional fulfillment creates a double
bind. Neither the realist ideal of the lawyer-policy scientist nor the
republican ideal of the lawyer-engineer offers acceptable counterideals to the lawyer-statesman. At the same time, the historical
"standard-bearers" of the lawyer-statesman ideal - large corporate law firms - no longer provide an environment "hospitable" to
the disposition of the lawyer-statesman. 98 Kronman exposes "revolutionary" and "irreversible" changes in the institutional structure,
culture, and practice of the large corporate law firm.99 The changes
reflect both outward, firm size and geographic diversification, and
inward, lawyer specialization and client-firm discontinuity, developments over the past two decades (pp. 274-78). Outwardly,
Kronman remarks, an increase in firm size, a greater differentiation
of "staffing hierarchies," such as two-track associate systems, parttime associates, and senior attorneys, and an expansion in the public disclosure of compensation practices, including firm revenues,
partnership shares, and associate salaries, undermine the internal
"stability" and "solidarity" of lawyer-firm "ties" (pp. 278-79). Inwardly, he adds, the growth of specialized knowledge and the shift
98. P. 308. Kronman considers large firms more congenial to women and blacks.
Vomen, he observes, "are joining large firms in numbers that are roughly proportionate to
their representation in the pool of qualified applicants" P. 292. Though conceding "occasional instances of overt sexism and allegations of a subtler but more pervasive discrimination in the assignment of work and promotion to partnership," he accumulates "little
evidence that large firms still discriminate against women on a systematic basis at the initial
hiring stage" Pp. 292-93. Whatever "competitive disadvantage" women suffer, therefore,
stems from personal preference, not institutional practice. Pp. 292-93. According to
Kronman, the "real challenge" confronting women is neither the gendered definition of job
qualifications nor overt and covert patterns of discrimination, but "finding the time and energy to do their jobs in the way and on the terms their firms demand, while also meeting
family responsibilities" Pp. 292-93. But see Marilyn J. Berger & Kari A. Robinson, Woman's
Ghetto Within the Legal Profession, 8 Wis. WoMEN's LJ.71, 72 (1992-93) ("Women [in the
legal profession] are still relegated to secondary status in position and pay.").
Blacks, by comparison, though "still not a significant presence" in large firms, furnish
Kronman with evidence of "some signs" of institutional advancement. P. 293. Other people
of color, Hispanics and Asians for example, apparently are not in evidence.
99. P. 274. Altman asserts that recent institutional changes "may have further undercut
the strength of the lawyer-statesman ideal," but "were not in fact the cause of that ideal's
decline or, in turn, of the current dissatisfaction in the American legal profession." Altman,
supra note 8, at 1034.
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to a "transactional" client-firm relationship'0o narrow the opportunities for lawyers to cultivate the "capacity" for ends-oriented judgment needed for third-personal deliberation.101 To Kronman, the
capacity to "synthesize" the considerations relevant to a client's
case and to give deliberative advice about "ends" distinguishes the
wise counselor from the technocrat.' °2
Kronman's wise counselor displays "a cultivated subtlety of
judgment whose possession constitutes a valuable trait of character,
as distinct from mere technical skill" (p. 295). That judgment values the practice of law as an "intrinsic good" not as an instrumental
enterprise for the pursuit of commercial or public interests (pp.
295-96). The cultural valuation of the noninstrumental rewards and
satisfactions of work conforms to a vision of the law as an honorable calling. 10 3 Modem large-firm corporate law practice, however,
frustrates Kronman's vision. Contemporary law firm culture, he
observes, is unable to sustain a belief in the virtues of character and
craftsmanship that inspire the ideal of the lawyer-statesman (p.
291). Although the "internal culture" of the large-firm appears
more "open" and "diversified" in social, economic, and religious
terms, this culture suffers under new "commercial" practices, conceived by marketing directors and management consultants, that
devalue the "internal goods of craftsmanship" (pp. 280, 293, 301).
Lawyers experience these practices concretely, for example, in a
longer average work day (pp. 281, 301, 303). Lengthening the work
day, Kronman opines, inhibits a lawyer's ability to develop his
"powers of judgment" outside the "realm of work," deforming his
"interests" and "attachments."' 4
To escape the double bind of failed public and private alternatives, Kronman advises practitioners inspired by the lawyer-states100. A transactional relationship stresses the episodic handling of special, exotic, unusual,
or exceptional matters by outside counsel trained in subject-matter specialties. Pp. 284-85.
101. Pp. 283-88. Kronman emphasizes practical wisdom as a trait of character acquired
"only through the experience of having to make the sorts of decisions that demand it - only
through an extended apprenticeship in judgment." P. 290.
102. Pp. 288-90. A transactional law practice "limits the relationship between each client
and the firm to a relatively brief episode whose extraordinary nature must often make it
difficult to draw, from that encounter alone, a full and balanced picture of the client's needs
and aspirations (which institutions too possess)." P. 286. Lacking a descriptively thick and
factually concrete deliberative context, "it becomes more difficult to advise a client in any but
instrumental terms, and in particular to answer the questions of ultimate ends that extraordinary situations often pose for the client's human representatives" P. 286. Kronman asserts
that a lawyer's chief function is to help a client decide what "ends" she should pursue. P. 288.
103. Kronman insists that a noble vision of the law as a calling historically imbued the
culture of large-firm practice, encouraging the view that "whatever its instrumental value, the
work of lawyers is also inherently rewarding and offers satisfactions that make the doing of it
valuable for its own sake." P. 294.
104. Pp. 304, 306-07. See Kronman, Living in the Law, supra note 3, at 839-40 ("What
makes the nakedly instrumental view of law practice ...so unattractive is that it takes in too
much of life, or more exactly, too much of what is important in life.").
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man ideal to "stay clear" of large-firm practice and, instead, seek
out smaller, "spin-off" firms, in-house corporate law departments,
or the "work of the country lawyer" in "small-town or small-city
practice" (pp. 378, 380). But, under Kronman's own analysis, such
alternative institutional settings fare no better in preserving the
lawyer-statesman ideal (p. 308). The in-house corporate law department, while offering a more "contextual" lawyer-client experience, confines the "range and diversity" of that experience and,
thus, deprives the in-house lawyer of the "opportunity" to engage
in cooperative deliberation regarding the choice of client ends (pp.
309-10). This lack of deliberative opportunity, combined with the
economic "vulnerability" that attends "single client" representation,105 compromises the in-house lawyer's independence and
weakens his capacity for deliberative wisdom (pp. 310-11). Similarly, pushed toward specialization and underdiversification, smallto-mid-sized firms flounder in an increasingly competitive commercial market (pp. 312-13).
Kronman concedes these deficiencies. That admission, however, will not solve his double bind. The solution lies in recontextualizing his treatment of professional ideals and practices. In place
of context, Kronman posits a dichotomy of intrinsic-instrumental
value, separating out the intrinsic virtues of character and craftsmanship from the instrumental virtues of advocacy and social justice. Next, he universalizes this division under the pretense of
neutrality. In the case of race and gender, the division collapses.
For women and blacks, intrinsic and instrumental virtues merge in
the craftsmanship of handling cases.
Like other subordinated groups, women and blacks invoke
"public-spirited reasons for becoming a lawyer.' 06 As Amy Gutmann notes, Kronman's intrinsic conception of legal virtue "unnecessarily separates" this spirit of public service from practical
judgment. 0 7 Lawyers motivated by social justice, according to Gutmann, "need not have anything resembling a purely instrumental
relation" to their work.108 Rather, she adds, "legal practice in defense of social justice may also be rewarding in itself, because it too
enlists the virtue of practical judgment."' 09
105. Kronman estimates that "the more a lawyer depends on a given client for material
support, the harder it becomes to preserve the distance that every real counselor must keep."
P. 311.
106. Gutmann, supra note 62, at 1767.
107. I at 1767.
108. Id.at 1768. Gutmann remarks: "In the service of social justice, law at its best enlists
the practical judgment of lawyers, and (as we have seen) the exercise of practical judgment
by lawyers requires deliberation with clients, the mutual interchange of relevant information,
and understanding." Id.
109. Id.
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Echoing this view, David Wilkins cites the intrinsic satisfactions

of the work accomplished by the "great lawyers" of the civil rights
movement.110 Paul Finkelman characterizes these "pioneering"
black lawyers as social engineers.'
Situating their work in the
"context of social and legal oppression,"" 2 F'mkelman explains that
"for most black lawyers in practice before 1944, there was no clear
distinction between the roles of 'social engineer' and a traditional
lawyer.""13 The distinction dissolved because blacks, in seeking entry into the legal profession," 4 "thrust themselves into the fight
against racism and segregation, regardless of their original intentions.""15 Kronman's inattention to the racial context of handling
cases distorts the social reality of black lawyers.
Kronman's decontextualization of practice also distorts his analysis of large-firm corporate lawyers. This is not to say that corporate lawyers no longer wield cultural authority. 116 That authority,

however, must be located in the context of historical discrimination
against women" 7 and blacks." 8 Discrimination taints the intrinsic
rewards of corporate law practice. Further, discrimination spawns
110. Wilkins, supra note 61, at 470. For a historical survey of civil rights movement lawyers, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUsADERS IN TmE CouRTs: How

A DEDICATED BAND OF

LAwYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CrVIL RIGHTS REVOLIrION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSICE (1976); MARK V. TusmNr, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AoAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).

111. Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REv. 161, 178 (1994) (reviewing J.CLAY SMr, JR.,
EMANCIPATION: TiE MAKING OF TmE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993)).
112. Id.at 165.
113. lId at 180.
114. See Joseph Gordon Hylton, The African-American Lawyer, the First Generation:
Virginia as a Case Study, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 107,114 (1994) (explicating the informal barriers blocking the entry of African-Americans into the legal profession during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
115. Finkelman, supra note 111, at 203 ("In offering legal services to African-Americans,
black lawyers gave a disenfranchised group a modicum of power and protection.").
116. See Robert L. Nelson, The Futuresof American Lawyers: A DemographicProfile of
a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L.REv. 345, 357 (1994)
(concluding that "corporate lawyers still have significant cultural authority: they can persuade sophisticated users that they have something valuable to offer").
117. See Mark S. Kende, Shatteringthe Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking DiscriminationAgainst Women Partners,46 HASTINGS L.J. 17,25 (1994) (reporting that "because
of discrimination, women lawyers and other professionals hit a glass ceiling and rarely reach
leadership positions in their law firms, law schools, or in public life"); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 90, at 649 ("Women actors in the legal system continue to report discrimination and the
perception of being treated differently from men ... in the legal system, while men report
either lack of consciousness or awareness of discriminatory practices or a belief that the system does operate fairly and neutrally.") (footnote omitted); cf. Nelson, supra note 116, at
377-78 ("[IThe broad statistics imply that, while men continue to enjoy higher rates of promotion, a substantial number of women are gaining partnership positions.").
118. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 653 ("[Tihe bad news is that partnership
rates for women and minorities are still lower than their participation and length of time in
the profession would predict and women and minorities remain highly segregated in different
parts of the profession."); Nelson, supra note 116, at 379 ("[W]hile there has been some
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institutional problems of family accommodation 19 and personal
fragmentation. 120 Carrie Menkel-Meadow attributes these
problems to "a clash of cultures" over "demands for more humane
and horizontally satisfying work on the one hand and the requirements and exigencies of the economic (and vertical) bottom line on

the other.' 12 ' Neglecting context, Kronman overlooks failings in
the intrinsic values of a corporate law practice founded on gender
and racial hierarchies.
CONCLUSION

Thwarted at an "institutional level," Kronman turns to individual lawyers, exhorting them to honor the ideal of the lawyer-statesman in their careers (pp. 7, 368). Yet, once again, the partisan ethos
of instrumentalism betrays him.122 That betrayal is inevitable, for
Kronman's thesis rests on a false dichotomy of intrinsic-instrumental value. Alternative practice ideals and traditions embraced by
feminist, 12 critical race, 24 and humanist 25 scholars demonstrate
the entrenched, interwoven nature of intrinsic and instrumental valincrease in the proportion of minorities in the upper precincts of the profession, it has come
very slowly and blacks in particular have not gained substantially.").
119. See David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 251 (1989) (appraising
reported levels of satisfaction among women lawyers balancing family and professional burdens); cf.Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLY. & L. 75,113 (1994) (mentioning that "in some instances the
development of parental or healthcare-giving leaves has occurred because of the activism of
some male attorneys, who also seek to spend more time with their families and who seek to
humanize their commitments to work").
120. CompareSusan S. Grover, Zoe Baird, Betrayaland Fragmentation,2 S. CAT- REv. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 429 (1993) (addressing the duality and fragmentation of female professionals) with Marc Linder, I Ain't Gonna Work on Zoe's Farm No More: Reply to Susan
Grover, 3 S.CAL_ REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 331, 333 (1994) (challenging female strategies
of personal-professional integration); see also Nelson, supra note 116, at 380 ("Qualitative
studies reveal that women attorneys still experience complex and risky career choices as they
attempt to juggle domestic responsibilities and professional work.").
121. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 623 (footnotes omitted).
122. Altman explains: "[T]he standard conception of the litigator's role since at least the
beginning of this century subordinates the defining virtues of the lawyer-statesman ideal,
practical wisdom and public-spiritedness, to the partisan goal of victory for the client." Altman, supra note 8, at 1034.
123. See e.g., RUTH COLMER, PREGNANT MEN: PRACICn

, THEORY, AND TE LAW

(1994); Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers," "Good Lawyers," and "Legal Ethics," 81 GEo. L. 2533
(1993); Naomi R. Calm, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475 (1993); Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spira The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REv.
1599 (1991).
124. See eg., L6PEz, supra note 101, at 11-82; David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the
Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black CorporateLawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993).
125. See; e.g., MiimE

S. BALL, Tam WoRD AND TH LAW (1993); Cunningham, supra

note 42, at 1331-87; Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo.
L.J. 2665 (1993); James Boyd White, Translationas a Mode of Though4 77 CoRNmLL L. REv.
1388 (1992).
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ues in lawyering. Practical pursuit of these values entails a complicated process of contextual accommodation Kronman seems

unwilling to acknowledge. Instead, he places his faith in an artifact
that privileges the mind and character of elite white, male, large-

firm private lawyers. Faith in the body of an artifact may earn
Kronman personal salvation, but it will not accord the legal profes-

sion secular salvation.
Peter Margulies notes that "Kronman's distrust of revolutionary politics leads to his rejection of civic humanist use of narratives as sources of memory for transformative politics or
law." Margulies, ProgressiveLawyering and Lost Traditions,supra note 67, at 1155. Justice
O'Connor attests to the power of narratives in lauding Justice Marshall's storytelling "capacity" to translate human "suffering in a way that others can bear and understand." Sandra
Day O'Connor, Thurgood MarshalL The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217,
1220 (1992).

